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CREATIVE INTERCHANGE BETWEEN 
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY: 
A CALL TO DIALOGUE 
William D. Eisenhower 
A novel situation has been created by the sympathetic treatment present-day 
philosophers are giving traditional Christian themes. What does this mean 
for the relationship between philosophy and theology? I begin my answer by 
defining terms and comparing two articles on methodology, one by a philos-
opher, the other by a theologian. Next I identify four conditions which must 
be met for creative interchange between the two disciplines to take place. I 
conclude with a critique of Gordon Kaufman's recent call for dialogue in 
Faith and Philosophy, finding that it fails to satisfy the conditions I have 
specified. 
Reinhold Niebuhr once observed that if a Christian theologian were invited 
to deliver a lecture at Columbia University, the philosophy department would 
be outraged. The remark serves as a reminder of a mutual antipathy which 
existed not too many years ago. But now the climate is changing. Certainly 
there are still those who view theology as arcane nonsense, and their coun-
terparts who see philosophy as an attempt to play God. Nevertheless, a novel 
situation has been created by the resurgence of Christian faith and the re-
newed interest in the philosophy of religion in philosophical circles. Speaking 
as a theologian, it seems obvious that it is time for the dividing wall of 
hostility to come down so that philosophers and theologians can learn from 
each other. 
The two disciplines have always been what John E. Smith calls "near 
relations," their overlap creating a context for mutual enrichment, but also 
for internecine antagonism.· We have seen the latter through most of the 
twentieth century. As a consequence, many theologians would be surprised 
at the turn toward belief some of their near relations have made in recent 
years. Religious topics are receiving explication from an unexpected quarter. 
Philosophy has taken off its shoes and is standing on holy ground. What does 
this mean for its relationship to theology? 
It could mean that conversations take place with one discipline assuming 
a dominant role. But this would mean that the dividing wall had not really 
come down. Another option involves creative interchange between the two, 
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with each discipline making an equal contribution. In what follows, I contend 
for the viability of this option by comparing two similar approaches to a 
critical methodological issue. Next I identify four conditions which must be 
met for creativity to be released. This is important lest one party or the other 
participate in a dialogue in which all contributors are equal but some are more 
equal than others. To illustrate this peril, I conclude with an examination of 
remarks addressed to philosophers by theologian Gordon Kaufman. 2 How-
ever, at the outset it is important to define a few key terms. 
Critical Terminology 
Creative interchange refers to that kind of communication which is most 
appropriate for discussing matters of great significance for human living. 3 It 
is conversation in which the unique features of divergent points of view are 
confirmed even as they qualify and enrich those of others. This means that 
affirmation has to accompany correction, to the end that all participants 
become at once more self-critical, and more self-esteeming. In such a process, 
creativity will be released to the extent that perspectives in conversation 
approximate an optimum balance between common and divergent reference 
points. Dialogue would not be creative, according to this understanding, when 
matters under discussion have little direct bearing on human living, nor when 
participants hold most things in common at the outset, nor again when dis-
agreements are so pronounced or conversation partners so partial that little 
common ground can be agreed upon. I am convinced that the present hour 
offers more congenial prospects for creative interchange between philoso-
phers and theologians than any time in recent memory. 
But if so, it is important to define the terms "philosophy" and "theology." 
No doubt some readers will find this unnecessary. Don't we already know 
what each discipline involves? Perhaps so, but it is worth considering that 
the opportunities of the moment require that this entire matter be rethought 
from the ground up. 
One place to being is with an analogy from a theologian of the Chicago 
School, Henry Nelson Wieman. 
If religion is like eating, then the reality which interests the religious person 
is analogous to food. In that case the theologian is the one who puts this food 
into such fonn that it is palatable and can most readily be eaten. The theolo-
gian is a good cook. But the philosopher is a dietician. He does not present 
God in a fonn that is digestible to the ordinary religious person. That is not 
his business. . . . The theologian talks about beefsteak and lettuce. The 
philosopher talks about starches and calories.4 
For Wieman, theology ensures the intellectual. integrity of religious devotion 
in order to make it rationally acceptable to persons of faith. Philosophy, by 
contrast, tests the assumptions on which this devotion rests. It seeks to de-
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termine the essential characteristics, if there be any, of the reality devotion 
directs itself to. S 
I take Wieman's analogy further in contending that in order to be respon-
sible cooks, it is important for theologians to partake of the meals they 
prepare, and to align themselves with a particular restaurant. This means that 
theologians are required to have religiously confronted the sacral reality they 
speak of and to have committed themselves to the ongoing life of the Church. 
To put the matter as simply as possible, according to this view, reflection 
which does not begin with faith in God and end with a concern for the fate 
of the Church is not Christian theology. 
This could hardly be true for philosophy. A dietician is not called upon to 
prepare anything for consumption. There is no requirement that he or she be 
personally familiar with how something tastes, nor with how it fares in an 
eating establishment. A philosopher analyzing faith, for instance, is not re-
quired to be a person of faith, nor to be related to a community of faith. 
Clearly, the philosopher has a measure of freedom not available to the 
theologian-but there is a trade-off. For one thing, to the non-philosopher, 
many philosophical treatises on religious issues seem rather abstract, because 
the qualities of personal investment and communal significance are not pres-
ent. When they are, philosophy merges into theology. Perhaps this very thing 
has been taking place in recent years. If so, it would explain an observation 
of William Lane Craig. "Today the Christian seeking after truth will probably 
learn more about the attributes of God from the works of Christian philoso-
phers than from those of Christian theologians."6 In terms of the analogy we 
are using, this would mean that the dieticians are now behaving more like 
cooks than the cooks themselves. However, for dialogue to be productive, it 
is important not to make blanket claims about who is better than whom, but 
rather to notice that we are now close enough to begin a sustained process 
of listening and learning. 
A Comparison 
Consider two articles on methodology, one by philosopher James Keller, 
the other by theologian Douglas OttatL7 Keller writes in response to an article 
by Alvin Plantinga. 8 The latter had stressed that Christian philosophers should 
undertake philosophical reflection in light of their Christian beliefs, not in 
light of contrary beliefs of the philosophicalluminaries.9 Keller feels that this 
raises without answering the question of how what he calls "secular beliefs" 
are related to "Christian beliefs. "10 He maintains that the former play an 
indispensable role in helping to define, clarify, and challenge interpretations 
of the latter.l1 Their relationship is a dialectical one, meaning that neither 
category receives automatic preeminence. "Sometimes Christian beliefs 
should be given precedence, but sometimes secular beliefs should be, even 
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when these have the consequence of implying the falsity of some Christian 
beliefs. "12 Against the charge that this could occasion the denial of one's faith, 
Keller argues that sheltering theological tenets from criticism is at least as 
likely to make one less faithful. This claim seems to have three warrants. 
First, such beliefs are the products of an all-too-finite-and-fragmented com-
munity and should not be excused from rational scrutiny. Second, "always to 
give the precedence to any of this group's beliefs over all of those of one's 
current culture would forever block any hope of gaining from that culture 
any critical insight into one's beliefs that might lead one to a more correct 
understanding of Christianity and of God's Will."13 Third, such critical insight 
is not likely to emerge from the theological tenets alone. 
Keller's case rests on two convictions. The first is that doctrine develops. 
The second is that Christians are obligated to adopt an increasingly more 
adequate set of beliefs as it becomes possible to do so. His word of choice 
to denote adequacy is "correct." Responsible faith requires us to ask about 
"the correct way to understand the Christian faith" and "to criticize our 
current understanding" of it. 14 The force of these two convictions stems from 
Keller's awareness of Christian circles in which modes of inquiry which 
might undermine official doctrine are forbidden. IS He feels constrained to 
warn his colleagues against steps which lead in this direction. "Always to 
reject any philosophical techniques or beliefs because they yield conclu-
sions inconsistent with one's current Christian beliefs would be to make too 
strong an assumption about the correctness of one's current understanding of 
Christianity. "16 
Ottati's article begins with the observation that the cumulative increase in 
scientific understanding requires that theology come to terms with the find-
ings of other disciplines. 17 Thus, right from the start we have a distinction 
which roughly parallels Keller's two categories of belief. In place of Keller's 
dialectical relationship, however, Ottati contends that "Christian theology is 
concerned to communicate Christian faith with integrity and intelligibility. "18 
By "integrity" Ottati means that faith is presented in a way which maintains 
the distinctive features of the Church's conceptual structure. By "intelligibil-
ity" he means that faith is communicated in a way which rings true to the 
experience of the contemporary listener, which means in turn that it takes 
account of interpretations arising from other fields of inquiry: philosophy, 
psychology, and sociology, to name but three. Thus integrity and intelligibil-
ity are the dual requirements for theological adequacy. They function to 
preserve the distinctiveness of Christianity's message while opening it to 
encounters with other disciplines. 19 
Ottati notes that when the standard of integrity is ignored-that is, when 
traditional symbols and categories are not a fundamental influence in theo-
logical construction-the price is steep. First, it is not likely that theology 
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will offer the community of faith any help in locating the same sovereign 
reality that earlier communities trusted in, let alone in grasping its purposes 
for the present.20 Second, it is also unlikely that theology will bring to light 
anything in human experience other than what secular men an women already 
find there.21 When the standard of intelligibility is ignored-that is, when 
thinking about God is not permitted to consider mundane experience-there 
are other dangers. One is that experience is bifurcated into mutually exclusive 
realms, one open to God, the other closed. But if this is the case then the 
effort to protect the integrity of our thinking about God from the corrosive 
effects of other perspectives deprives us of the thing we sought to save: 
classical theology's God, the sovereign Lord of every dimension of human 
life.22 What is more, "present experience, and reflection about it, lacks prox-
imity to God that allows it to function as a critical check on the interpretations 
of the apostolic communities. "23 
This review of the two articles is all too brief. But a few items for com-
parison have come into focus. Many might have thought that methodology 
would be the least likely point at which philosophers and theologians could 
profit from each other. Much to the contrary, we see that Keller and Ottati 
are in the same ballpark, perhaps even on the same team. It is reasonable to 
assume that the mutual influence of the perspectives they represent would be 
creative because of the balance between the similarities and differences in 
the arguments they marshall. The similarities are there because each offers a 
both/and approach to Christianity and nonchristian sources of human under-
standing, and because each is convinced that the latter offers the former an 
indispensable means of self-criticism. 
This makes their differences all the more interesting. Keller's heavy use of 
the word "correct" implies a tighter standard than Ottati's dual requirements 
do. Keller construes faith's conceptual content as so many isolated units of 
belief, whereas Ottati's construal has a broader sweep to it, one which takes 
too much for granted the notion that there is a distinctiveness to Christianity 
which, if not self-evident, is at the very least a matter of wide agreement. 
Furthermore, Keller's proposal seems to call for a case-by-case consideration 
of Christian beliefs-so that the ones determined to be wrong can be set right. 
Ottati's would seems to require formulations which are no longer compelling 
to drop quietly out of sight. 
The point not to be missed, however, is that their points of divergence are 
formally related to a more fundamental contrast. Keller is concerned about 
faith as an individual commits to it. Ottati is speaking about faith as it is 
communicated. A world of difference opens up at this point. Ottati, the theo-
logian, sees reflection on faith's conceptual content as internally related to 
the Church's call to proclaim it. Yesterday's proclamation enabled the Church 
to relate itself to sacral reality with some measure of success. It is the 
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theologian's job to see that today's is equally effective. Keller, the philoso-
pher, does not mention any concern he might have regarding the impact his 
remarks will have on the Church-nor should he. In fact, according to the 
view argued here, it is this concern for the fate of the Church which separates 
the theologian from the philosopher, and which has to be borne in mind during 
encounters between them. 
Four Conditions 
As this comparison demonstrates, philosophy and theology are in comfort-
able speaking distance of one another. But for encounters between a Keller 
and an Ottati to release creativity's full potential, four conditions must be 
met. First, definitions of key terms must be offered at the outset. Second, 
each participant must acknowledge that the inherently new context in which 
the dialogue is taking place makes this kind of initial caution necessary. 
Third, each must recognize that creativity is hindered when the premises 
according to which the interchange is to evolve are stipulated in advance-
especially when they are stipulated unilaterally. Finally each participant must 
confront the fact that entering a dialogue without imposing terms on the other 
requires trust in the goodness of creative interchange. Dialogue can be cre-
ative only where it draws courage from religious faith-however un-
thematized-in an availability of grace sufficient to hold in check the anxiety 
which creative advances invariably produce. 
These conditions are important enough to warrant expanded treatment. 
The meanings of terms like "philosophy" and "theology" are not on file 
somewhere, needing only to be drawn out and reviewed from time to time. They 
have to be established anew in each generation. The promise of creative inter-
change is that philosophers will gain new insights into theology, and their own 
discipline as well, by hearing how theologians see the two-and vice versa. 
To this end, I began with a theologian's view of what distinguishes the two. 
This view owes something to Barth, and something to Wieman. I believe 
with Barth that Christian theology is inexorably tied to the Christian Church. 
However, the new situation in philosophy makes Barth's reputation of it 
untenable. Thus I follow Wieman in believing that philosophy and theology 
need one another. 
This is why I find Wieman's analogy helpful. The philosopher and the 
theologian both seek to make reality intelligible, just as the dietician and the 
cook both work with food. But what sets the cook apart from the dietician is not 
merely a matter of vocabulary, although this is as far as Wieman explicated the 
matter: the one confined to traditional terminology, "beefsteak and lettuce"; the 
other free to develop more technical terms, "starches and calories". The more 
profound point is that the cook prepares fare for consumption by the general 
public, whereas the dietician qua dietician does not. It seems to me that the 
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analogy asks for a Barthian twist which Wieman did not give it: the theologian 
must be a person of faith who relates faith issues to a community of faith. 
But why should this be? The answer is that theology exists for the Church 
to ensure that when the faithful gather, their pastors can confidently affirm 
something worth affirming. If they cannot, the flock will wander off to other 
pastures where other shepherds speak with conviction, perhaps ill-advisedly. 
The danger of the Church going out of business by losing confidence in the 
saving significance of its message-this is not an extraneous concern for the-
ology. Just as chef and restaurant share one fate, so do theologian and Church. 
The same challenges which face the Church confront the scholars who 
superintend its message. Take for instance a reality which neither can escape: 
Sunday morning. With unfaltering regularity Sunday arrives, bringing the 
faithful together to hear about God. Theology'S assignment is to see that they 
do not go away hungry. Other interests can never interfere with this primary 
task. Why not? The answer is simple: Good News delayed is Good News 
denied. Either God is alive in the present moment, or Sunday morning wor-
ship loses its meaning. When the meaning leaves, so do the people. Other 
gospels commandeer their allegiance. This means that a burdensome sense 
of urgency pervades the theological enterprise. It is, in fact, a constituent part 
of the discipline, and when it is lost, reflection ceases to be theological. 
Like many disciplines, theology answers a host of questions, some of which 
are closer to its heart than others. Theology's primary questions arise from 
the declaration, "The Kingdom of God is at hand." Who is this God? What 
is thil> Kingdom? Is it for me? How can I be sure? On what basis? What must 
I do to inherit it? These primary subjects for investigation have to do with 
what Stephen Ely called the "religious availability" of God.2~ They are the 
questions preachers are called to major in. Theology is under a time constraint 
because it is answerable to these preachers and the regularly assembling 
congregations they serve. 
Now then. Secondary concerns enter the picture very quickly. They arise 
from various sources. There are the claims from the secular world as lifted 
up by Keller and Ottati, the teachings of the other world religions, and the 
Church's long history of reflection. How is all this related to the gospel from 
which the Church draws its life? Fascinating issues surface here. The chal-
lenge facing the theologian is to articulate answers to the secondary questions 
in ways which bring attention back to the driving concerns which prompted 
them in the first place. 
Not all of the issues surrounding the religious availability of God's grace 
can be resolved from one Sunday to the next, nor even in a single lifetime. 
No matter. Theology calls women and men to commitment on the basis of an 
understanding which is sufficient for this purpose, but which includes within 
itself the recognition that much remains unsettled. 
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Thus there is a "leap of faith" element in theology, and it persists even after 
the Church has disappeared from view. Religious scholars who have little 
interest in the relevance their thought has for communities of faith are nev-
ertheless notorious for prematurely closing off discussion of fundamental 
issues. For instance, one does not have to look too far to find theologians 
whose efforts to relate faith to philosophy take the form of an argument that 
this philosopher, and this one alone, provides Christian faith with the over-
arching vision it sorely needs. This is confusing to philosophers, who can 
only scratch their heads and ask, "Why Whitehead of all people?" Why, 
indeed, when there are so many philosophers to choose from? The answer is 
that theology's perennial impatience persists after the commitment which 
engendered it has disappeared. One could say, a theologian is a philosopher 
in a hurry. 
But if their misuse of philosophy is unfortunate, the impatience which 
prompts it may not be. In the words of theologian Daniel Day Williams, 
Christianity does not ... have to wait until philosophers have come to a 
decision on the validity, say, of the ontological argument (when will that be?) 
before Christians can say they have knowledge of the God who is the living 
reality of creative and redemptive love in our midst.26 
Even so, the willingness of theologians to rush in where philosophers take 
their time means that theological understanding cannot escape its signature 
quality of being an apprehensive comprehension, for it is always possible that 
concerns which were set aside in the interest of giving the Church something 
to say will prove the undoing of those which were not. Quite simply, for the 
theologian, there is no way to avoid being apprehensive. The choice is to 
include one's uneasiness within the circle of theological reflection, or to 
ignore it and be ruled by it. 
Philosophers are not subject to theological anxiety. Their discipline does 
not concern itself with the fate of the Christian Church and the time constraint 
life from one Sunday to the next produces. As a consequence, a theologian 
monitoring a philosophical discussion which addresses a matter of religious 
concern notices the differences. The question has lost something of its ur-
gency, lost its direct connection to personal faith, lost its immediate relevance 
to the religious community, and lost its requirement that the discussion be 
accessible to "the ordinary religious person" (Wieman's phrase). But he or 
she also sees an obvious gain: unhurried, unrestrained opportunity. No one 
feels that the matter must receive a final determination by this Sunday, or 
ever for that matter. 
Consider the question of the traditional concerns of each discipline. With 
theology, these arise out of the proclamation of the Kingdom of God, whereas 
with philosophy, they grow out of attempts to gain insight into the nature of 
reality by asking about its most fundamental and general characteristics. 
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Theology dies when it abandons its traditional concerns. This is not true of 
philosophy. There is nothing to say philosophers cannot dispense with meta-
physics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion in order to restrict themselves 
to logic, linguistic analysis, and epistemology. These may dominate attention 
indefinitely. 
When they care to, philosophers can take up questions like the uniqueness 
of Christianity, the nature of faith, reason and revelation, or any other topic 
which might popularly be associated with theology. When they do, some 
observers will be hard pressed to distinguish the philosopher from the theo-
logian. The question to ask is: is this person functioning as a cook or as a 
dietician? The former will take up such issues as matters of personal concern 
in order to mediate the availability of the Living God to the on-going life of 
the Church. The latter will not. Thus, in place of the apprehensive compre-
hension of theology, we have the comprehensive apprehension of philosophy, 
that is, the widest possible mental grasp of life in all its facets. Complex 
issues are not prematurely resolved; faith can be investigated from the out-
side; no religious community hangs in the balance; and it is not necessary 
that religious issues be construed in such a way as to make their discussion 
intelligible to the educated lay person.2' 
No doubt my endeavor to place philosophy and theology in relation to each 
other falls short in certain respects. I offer it as one person's attempt to 
address the first of the conditions which must be satisfied for creative inter-
change to take place. Unless conversations begin here, the results can be very 
confusing, a point which will be clearer when we tum to Gordon Kaufman's 
call to dialogue. 
The New Situation 
The second condition requires participants to recognize the turn philoso-
phers at the end of the twentieth century have made toward the Christian 
tradition. This may be difficult for some theologians. Generations of seminary 
students have regarded philosophy with suspicion if not outright contempt. 
Diogenes Allen identifies "three streams" which have fed this long-standing 
negative attitude.28 "One stream may be represented by Karl Barth .... The 
other two springs are nineteenth and twentieth century biblical studies and 
work in the history of doctrine, especially that of Adolph Harnack. "29 One 
could add that for a number of years, Philosophy la courses have not typically 
been taught in a way which highlighted the discipline's compatibility with 
Christian truth-claims. Allen also points out that "the discipline of philosophy 
today, especially in the English-speaking world, is so remote from theology 
that it takes prolonged study of philosophy before one's theological under-
standing is enhanced to a significant degree. "30 
Be that as it may, the theologian reading Faith and Philosophy may be 
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surprised to discover topics which have been abandoned in some theological 
circles: creation ex nihilo, the Trinity, the Resurrection, revelation, faith, and 
prayer, to name but a few. He or she will most likely see this as a radically 
new state of affairs, and come to the conclusion that it is quite simply no 
longer possible to regard the relationship between the two diciplines with the 
assumptions of the past. The thought may even occur that faith and unbelief 
have traded comers. But the point is that if conversations between philoso-
phers and theologians are to be productive, this new set of circumstances has 
to be recognized. 
Thus it is imperative that neither side seek to stipulate in advance the 
conditions according to which they shall proceed. Theology has its own 
integrity, to use Ottati's word, as does philosophy-integrity which would be 
violated by imposition from another quarter. If creative interchange is going 
to be genuine, this means the outcome will be unpredictable. New under-
standings will be authentically new to the extent that participants release the 
dialogue to shape itself out of what each party contributes. 
But this is easier said than done. Territorial impulses too often appear 
disguised as the desire to conserve hard-won advances. Parochial insights 
masquerade as universal truths. The new understandings which creative in-
terchange makes possible inevitably require that former perspectives be mod-
ified, something which rarely takes place without a sense of personal loss. 
We have to be broken in order to go forward, a point Wieman insisted upon. 
We must be broken because there is a good so great that it breaks the bounds 
of our littleness. We must be broken because there is a power which works 
in our lives to achieve a good we cannot compass and cannot discern, until 
some later time in retrospect reveals the form of the new creation now invis-
ibly emerging. Our own anticipatory vision is always too narrow, biased, and 
self-centered to comprehend it.3! 
No doubt most of us would prefer to enlarge our understanding without 
having to lose anything along the way. Thus we are tempted to forestall the 
transcending of present perspective by exerting as much control as possible-
as in dictating the terms of an encounter ahead of time. 
But a genuine encounter is an adventure. Risk is not avoided but embraced 
in the conviction that creative interchange more than compensates for what 
has to be set aside. Even so, there are no guarantees. Perhaps it would be 
better for the philosopher or theologian who cannot enter into an encounter 
with a measure of openness and trust not to share in one at all. 
Yet if perfect trust is required few of us would qualify. Thus it seems 
preferable to ask participants to search their hearts, to become self-critical of 
their resistance to change, and to cultivate a healthy appreciation for the role 
sacral reality plays in any significant endeavor. In conversations about ulti-
mate issues, if anything worthwhile emerges it will do so despite the oppo-
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sition we are inclined to muster and because of a power which surpasses ours, 
and which is capable of creating "a kingdom of goodness in depth and height 
and scope so far beyond the reach of any human plan that it must not be 
constricted to our imposed directive. "32 
We have come to the fourth condition required for the promise interchange 
holds to be fulfilled: trust in the availability of grace. Faith in grace is 
necessary because without it anxiety will frustrate our attempts to reach 
across from one field of expertise to another. Faith in grace is necessary 
because otherwise every invitation to rise above a reigning philosophical or 
theological paradigm will be perceived as a temptation to fall below it. Faith 
in grace is necessary if the misgivings of the heart are to be quieted suffi-
ciently to allow new perspectives to emerge. It is appropriate for a theologian 
to suggest: dialogue does not have to wait until grace is defined fully or in 
such a way as to satisfy all comers. All that is required is that those in 
conversation reckon with the benevolence at work in encounters of signifi-
cance which is capable of bringing us to a new level of understanding which 
at present we cannot envisage. 
Consider the alternative: philosophers and theologians discussing issues of 
religious import while harboring grave doubts as to whether a source of 
goodness works in and among us. Representatives of theology, as I have 
defined it, would find such a prospect a horrible incongruity. We would hope 
that others could see that this kind of conversation drains religious issues of 
whatever saving significance makes them worth discussing and restricts 
creativity's capacity to engender novel ways of construing them. If this is not 
widely accepted, then a serious impediment to creative interchange needs to 
be faced. In as much as it is dialogue between Christians which is under 
consideration, this point about grace may not need to be argued further. 
Critiquing a Call for Dialogue 
I have presented the four conditions which must be met to ensure that 
encounters between philosophy and theology will be productive. While not 
the final word on the matter (how could they be?) I believe we now have a 
place to begin which is sufficient for analyzing other calls for dialogue. 
In "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Gordon Kaufman directs our 
attention to the need for dialogue. "Philosophical reflection is indispensable for 
theology; and theological reflection may have some important insights to offer 
philosophers. "33 We can be grateful to Kaufman for putting this issue on the 
table, for doing so in a way which presents a valuable overview of the problems 
confronting religious belief at the end of the present century, and for including 
a compelling reminder that "if we try to overcome and control the mystery within 
which we live ... we sin against God. "34 What is more, his article illustrates 
the apprehensiveness of theology which I have characterized above. 
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Kaufman argues that present-day philosophical discussions of evidential-
ism are not of much use to contemporary theology. He explains that the 
Judeo-Christian tradition long embodied a certain kind of evidentialism from 
its inception forward. All along it drew on the conviction that evidence for 
the reality and activity of God could be found in history and experience. The 
problem is that contemporary theologians do not share this conviction be-
cause of factors which have forced a "shift in interest and attention."3S 
Kaufman's final point is that there is an irreducible element of mystery 
discoverable in human experience, and that "the debate focusing on 
'evidences' for this or that particular detail in traditional beliefs about God 
are simply failing to notice or take account of the depths of this mystery 
within which we humans live. "36 Thus Kaufman's problem is not really with 
evidentialism-he makes appeals to history and experience, too-but with 
the traditional categories which obscure the true nature of the reality which 
the evidence actually discloses, that being "inscrutable Mystery. "37 His call 
for theologians and philosophers to learn from each other needs to be seen 
in relation to his objection to traditional theism, and not merely in relation 
to the narrower topic in which he couches it. 
I have argued that encounters between philosophy and theology must sat-
isfy four conditions if they are to be useful. Kaufman's call for dialogue fails 
to satisfy any of them. First of all, he fails to begin by defining his terms. 
Neglecting to position theology and philosophy in relation to each other has 
several serious consequences, the chief of which is that his understanding of 
theology is not under his control. Kaufman argues that Christian theologians 
"have been driven" by religious pluralism, new theories about the influence 
conceptual framework and symbolic expression have on experience and 
thought, and the unprecedented evils of the twentieth century into a state of 
deep-seated suspicion toward their own tradition. 38 Yet, surely it is fair to 
ask, Why have the theologians been driven thus, if many philosophers have 
not been? Are we to assume that theologians are more sensitive to these 
concerns than philosophers? Or is it possible that the problems they pose are 
not sufficient to invalidate faith as he believes? Philosophers have chosen to 
affirm traditional Christianity during the same period that the theologians 
Kaufman represents have experienced their "shift in interest and attention." 
Thus it is self-evident that traditional categories continue to attract a religious 
response-even in the face of the issues that Kaufman highlights. If these 
issues are not as determinative as Kaufman maintains, this means that his 
skepticism draws some of its strength from other factors-ones of which he 
is unaware. I submit that anyone thinking through the relationship between 
the two disciplines could not read Kaufman's article without coming across 
the objection I am rising. If he had defined his terms, he would have had a 
firmer grasp on his material. 
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From my perspective, the key feature distinguishing theology from philos-
ophy is the sense of mission in the former, one characterized by an urgency 
to bring ultimate issues to some sort of resolution. But this is the very thing 
which Kaufman argues against. Behind this, one assumes that theology's 
essential connection to the Christian Church is missing as well. With all due 
respect, it has to be asked if he is speaking as a theologian at all. No doubt 
he is from his perspective-but here again we see why it is imperative to define 
one's terms. By failing to do so, Kaufman leaves his readers in the dark. 
There are no definitions of terms, we can suppose, because Kaufman did 
not think it was necessary. Surely philosophy is whatever the philosophers 
happen to be doing, just as theology is the same. But unfortunately, Kaufman 
neglects to reckon with the interest in religious issues generally, and the 
embracing of Christian concepts specifically, among the audience his article 
addresses. Thus he fails to satisfy the second condition. 
Even supposing that his audience were making a colossal mistake, there 
are reasons for greeting it with a measure of provisional acceptance. Any 
conversation-to be successful-requires that participants grant one another 
the right to stand where they do. But beyond this point of good manners, we 
theologians need to ask ourselves, Is it possible that there are good philo-
sophical reasons behind the turn toward the Christian tradition our near re-
lations have made? If this is at least conceivable, and I believe that it is, then 
we have all the more reason to hold our criticisms at bay. 
But this is self-restraint which Kaufman is not willing to exercise. Instead 
of seeing the resurgence of belief among philosophers as an advance which 
creates new opportunities for mutual interaction, he takes it as a puzzling 
condition which impedes it. Puzzling and wrong-headed. Philosophers now 
"trivialize the very ideas and beliefs which they are seeking to explore and 
understand. "39 To his mind, theologians have avoided this by adopting a more 
judicious stance. "Today we are forced to take with greater seriousness the 
fact that we do not know, and that we can see no way in which we will ever 
be able to plumb, the true meaning of human life-or whether there even is 
such a thing. "40 
Kaufman is not explicit as he sets the terms which philosophers must accept 
in order to participate in advanced theological discussions. But his central 
stipulation is hard to miss: give up your traditional Christianity! This impo-
sition on philosophy violates the third of the conditions I have presented. It 
has several unfortunate consequences. It restricts the opportunities creative 
interchange will have to produce genuinely novel understandings. It allows 
philosophers no freedom to answer, and thus no sense of ownership in what 
transpires. It communicates no willingness to meet halfway, and thus no real 
desire to listen as well as to speak. And finally, it demonstrates theology's 
perennial impatience, but to no good effect. 
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If a genuine encounter is to take place, participants on both sides will have 
to demonstrate a measure of trust in the power of creative interchange to 
replace good perspectives with better ones. Since loss of perspective is a 
stress-inducing experience, one which can only be endured by faith, it is 
essential that we trust that grace works wherever creative advance is under 
way. Few of us will have the courage to work out our salvation in fear and 
trembling unless we are convinced that God works in us to will and to act 
according to his good purpose. 
As I noted earlier, Kaufman scores high marks for his compelling argument 
associating sin with the chronic human tendency to control the mystery which 
surrounds us. But the evidence of sin he finds on our side is not matched by 
evidence of grace on mystery's side. This creates a theologically untenable 
position, for there is no doctrine of sin which can survive for long without 
being connected in some way or another to a doctrine of grace. There are 
philosophical problems as well: he is a theologian anxious to resolve things 
by claiming there is no resolution. But the absence of a doctrine of grace is 
his principal problem. It accounts for his lack of trust in creative interchange, 
which in turn explains the unreasonable demand he thrusts on those with 
whom he seeks to communicate. 
In Conclusion 
Theology and philosophy have been in dialogue for two millennia. As we 
move toward the third, a new situation has come into being. The fact that 
philosophers are interested in religious questions should be welcomed by 
theologians. If answers are couched in traditional categories-it is not 
theology's place to criticize. To the contrary, this could help theology answer 
more of the questions it faces without losing its constitutive sense of urgency. 
In fact, the chances have seldom been better for the encounter between the 
two to prove beneficial to both. 
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